Monetary policy in Asia: approaches and implementation by Takatoshi Ito & Bank for International Settlements
BIS Papers No 31  105
 
 
Japanese monetary policy:  




The objective of this paper is to review critically policy actions of the Bank of Japan under a 
deflationary environment from 1998 to 2005. The economic environment was unfavourable 
from 1998 to 2004. Output activities were stagnating at best. The deflation, in the sense of a 
negative inflation rate, was getting worse and the unemployment rate was increasing. 
Confidence in the financial system was quite weak as several banks failed. During the 
period, the Bank, having become legally independent in March 1998, aimed at stimulating 
the economy, ending deflation and stabilizing the financial system. The availability and 
effectiveness of traditional policy instruments was severely constrained as the policy interest 
rate was already virtually at zero, and the nominal interest rate could not become negative 
(the zero bound problem). Worsening deflation means that the real interest rate (the nominal 
interest rate minus the inflation rate) has to rise. Therefore a deteriorating economy, putting 
pressure to lower prices, would reinforce itself by increasing the real interest rate. 
The actions and decisions of the Bank of Japan have become a focus of policy debate in 
Japan, as well as the theme of many academic papers, since the experience of deflation 
combined with the zero bound problem was quite unique in postwar history. Some papers 
examined Japanese monetary policy in the period since the early 1990s with the view that 
the Bank might have been too eager to burst the bubble and allow a sharp decline and slow 
recovery in output activities. The mistake was to allow deflation to occur in the first place. 
Other papers put the emphasis on how to affect expectations of the future inflation rate once 
the general price level had started to decline and the interest rate had become zero. This 
paper focuses on the period after 1998, when the Bank gained legal independence and the 
economy fell into deflation (ie, the CPI inflation rate became negative). 
Several key decisions from 1998 to 2005 will be examined in this paper. First, the decision to 
move to the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) in the spring of 1999 will be examined as to 
whether it was taken later than would have been desirable. Second, the judiciousness of the 
decision to lift the ZIRP (ie, raise the interest rate) in August 2000 will be examined. At the 
time, the inflation rate was still negative and the prospect of economic recovery was nascent 
at best. Third, the effectiveness of quantitative easing (QE) that was introduced in March 
2001, along with the decision to go back to a zero interest rate, will be examined. 
Quantitative easing means that the Bank of Japan provides enough liquidity to financial 
markets so that commercial banks will pile up excess reserves at the Bank of Japan. The 
policy interest rate in the interbank market naturally becomes zero. The balance of the 
current account at the Bank of Japan becomes the policy variable. The effectiveness of QE, 
or any additional effects to ZIRP, has been debated. Fourth, the Bank did not adopt 
proposals for non-conventional monetary policy measures, including to purchase foreign 
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bonds, to purchase equities (as a monetary policy), to purchase real estate (funds), to adopt 
inflation targeting, and to cooperate with the Ministry of Finance to carry out nonsterilised 
interventions. Fifth, the policy switch from QE back to ZIRP and announcement of a desirable 
inflation rate range (although not as a target) in March 2006 will be briefly touched upon. The 
exit from the QE framework in March 2006 was made smoothly, as the Bank of Japan 
decided to lower the excess reserves gradually. The range of inflation that is called the 
“understanding” of policy board members about price stability was disclosed at the same 
time. The paper will examine whether this is a first step towards inflation targeting. 
All of these issues will be examined in the light of the political economy of an independent 
central bank. The 1998 Bank of Japan law enhanced independence and increased 
transparency. The Policy Board members include the Governor and the two Deputy 
Governors and six members appointed as monetary experts. The Governor has a five-year 
term, during which he/she will not be fired unless determined by the House of 
Representatives to be physically incapacitated. 
Section 2 will review chronologically how the Bank of Japan operated from 1998 to 2003, the 
era under Governor Hayami’s leadership. Section 3 will review the Bank’s policy under 
Governor Fukui’s leadership. Section 3 examines the debate on inflation targeting in Japan. 
Section 4 discusses the exit conditions of QE, and Section 5 discusses the exit from QE in 
March 2006. 
2. Japanese  monetary policy, 1998-2003 
2.1.  New Bank of Japan, 1998 
Although it is interesting to examine the monetary policy that led to the difficult position of 
1998, those policy issues are yielded to the rich literature of the bubble and burst of the 
Japanese economy from mid-1980s to mid-1990s. See Cargill et al (1997) and Ito and 
Mishkin (2006) for a summary and assessments of Japanese monetary policy since the 
mid-1980s. See also Ito (2004a) for reasons for the long stagnation of the Japanese 
economy. In this section, monetary policy since 1998 will be discussed. 
The Bank of Japan law was revised in 1997 and became effective on 1 April 1998. Due to a 
corruption scandal, the Governor was replaced just before the new law took place. The new 
Governor Yujiro Hayami, when appointed in March 1998, was 72 years old. He was originally 
on the Bank of Japan staff, but had left the Bank 17 years earlier as an executive. The two 
Deputy Governors were Mr Yamaguchi, a long-time Bank employee, and Mr Fujiwara, a 
journalist. The latter was a surprising appointment. 
The Bank of Japan Law of 1998 is in every sense a state-of-the-art modern central banking 
law. The central bank is given a mandate of price stability (Article 2), and there is no mention 
of aggregate demand or full employment as part of its objective. Institutional independence is 
guaranteed in the sense that Governors as well as Policy Board members will not be 
dismissed unless physically or mentally incapacitated; their terms of appointment are five 
years; government officials attend Board meetings only as non-voting members. See Cargill 
et al (2000, chapter 4) for a detailed comparison of the old and new Bank of Japan Laws. 
Cargill et al (1997, ch 4) concluded that the score of independence, developed by Cukierman 
et al (1993), rose substantially for the Bank of Japan with the new BoJ law, from near bottom 
among 18 advanced countries to the middle of the pack. 
Monetary policy decisions are made by majority vote at the Monetary Policy Meetings 
(MPMs) of the Policy Board. (Note that the Policy Board will decide many other policy and 
internal administration matters. The MPMs are only part of the Policy Board’s tasks at the 
Bank of Japan.) The new law states that members of the Policy Board are appointed on the 
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members. The Board is composed of nine members: the Governor, two Deputy Governors 
and six experts on monetary affairs and economics. 
The transparency of monetary policy decision-making was greatly enhanced under the new 
regime supported by the new law. It was often said that real decision-making was done 
internally (internal executive meeting) and the MP Board was rubber-stamping the decision 
that was already made. Under the old regime, there was no disclosure of minutes or 
transcript. The Monetary Policy Board was revamped in the appointment criteria. In April 
1998, the Bank under the new law started to announce the decision on the day of meeting 
and the Governor gives a press conference on the decision within a few days. Detailed 
minutes are publicly disclosed several weeks after the meeting - comparable to the Federal 
Reserve Board, and the meeting minutes in about a month and a half. It was decided that the 
transcript would be disclosed in later years. 
2.2.  Zero interest rate policy 
The new team of members in the Policy Board installed in April 1998 immediately faced a 
challenging situation: the average growth rate had been extremely low, at around 1% since 
1992, and the financial institutions had become very weak. In particular, a major financial 
institution failed in November 1997, and the psychology of the financial market turned 
extremely negative in the spring of 1998. The growth rate turned negative in the first quarter 
of 1998, the fragile financial institutions were downgraded by credit rating agencies and 
obliged to pay a higher interest rate in the interbank market (“Japan premium”), and prices 
started to decline. 
Three events contributed to a weakening of the Japanese economy in 1997-98: the 
consumption tax (VAT) rate was increased in April 1997; Japan’s banking crisis erupted in 
November 1997 and continued to the spring of 1999; and the Asian currency crisis started in 
July 1997 and continued to the spring of 1998. The Japanese financial institutions had to pay 
the Japan premium (see Ito and Harada (2005)) when they borrowed dollars in the London 
offshore markets. The growth rates were quickly going down and so was the inflation rate. 
The textbook policy response to this kind of economic weakness would be to relax both fiscal 
and monetary policy. The fiscal position changed from tightening with the April 1997 tax hike 
to relaxing with a large stimulus expenditure package in the autumn of 1997. But monetary 
policy could not be relaxed substantially, because the official discount rate was already at a 
historical low of 0.50% and the policy interest rate (uncollateralised call rate) was slightly 
below the official discount rate in the spring of 1998. Monetary policy basically did not 
change in 1998, except for lowering the call rate from just below 0.50% to 0.25% 
9  September, and making a decision to allow commercial paper (CP) monetary policy 
operation instruments 13 November. 
See Figure 1 for the GDP growth rate and Figure 2 for the inflation rate. Note that the GDP 
numbers in Figure 1 are the new estimates as of November 2005. The real-time growth rate 
published by the Cabinet Office and used as a basis of policymaking as of 1998 was 
different, due to the different estimation method and available statistics. 
The Bank of Japan started to fight deflation, but it was more tentative than decisive. 
Governor Hayami repeatedly suggested that he regarded deflation as not necessarily a bad 
thing and that aggressive monetary policy might not be called for. See Ito (2004b) for quotes 




Growth rate, 1994:II-2006:I 
 
 
Note: Chain index, quarter-to-quarter growth rate, annualised. 




Note: Inflation rate of CPI excluding fresh food (and consumption tax increases of April 1997), 
percentage change from the same month a year earlier. The influence of the consumption tax 
increase is estimated as 1.5 percentage points. 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
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After statistics showed that the Japanese economy was experiencing negative growth for 
several quarters and deflation was getting worse, the Bank of Japan adopted the zero 
interest rate policy (ZIRP). On 12 February 1999, the MPM passed the zero interest rate 
decision with 8:1 votes, with Ms Shinotsuka dissenting. From March 1999 to July 2000, a 
similar split occurred. Mr Nakahara argued that the ZIRP was not enough and proposed 
more actions including quantitative easing, while Ms Shinotsuka argued in favour of 
terminating the ZIRP. 
The precise statement said that “The Bank of Japan will provide more ample funds and 
encourage the uncollateralised overnight call rate to move as low as possible”. The Bank of 
Japan planned to lower the interest rate to 0.15% immediately, and would then lower it to 
zero in a few weeks. (See Appendix 1 for the precise language.) So, it took a few weeks to 
get to zero. In April, Governor Hayami mentioned that the ZIRP would continue “until 
deflationary concerns are dispelled”. (See Okina and Shiratsuka (2004) for dating Governor 
Hayami’s words as April.) However, the precise definition of “deflationary concerns are 
dispelled” was not clarified. 
2.3.  Was ZIRP introduced too late? 
In order to answer the question of whether it was too late to introduce the ZIRP in the spring 
of 1999, the scope should be expanded to a period before the birth of the new Bank of Japan 
in March 1998. Several studies, such as Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Jinushi et al (2000), 
McCallum (2003) and Taylor (2001), show that the Bank of Japan should have eased quite 
aggressively in the early stages of the bursting of a bubble, 1991-92. Clouse et al (2000) and 
Ahearne et al (2002) were two studies at the Federal Reserve Board on the experience of 
the onset of deflation in Japan. In order to avoid deflation, the Bank of Japan should have 
eased much more aggressively before 1995, as by that time the effectiveness of 
conventional policy instruments had become weak. Both studies can be interpreted such 
that, learning from the Japanese experience, policy actions to ease aggressively if and when 
the inflation rate becomes alarmingly low are endorsed. 
Harrigan and Kuttner (2005) did an exercise using two sets of Taylor-rule coefficients, one 
estimated from the Japanese experience and one estimated from FRB experience, in order 
to evaluate the Bank of Japan’s actual policy from 1990 to end-1995. The one with Japanese 
coefficients obviously tracks the actual call rate quite well in the period 1990 to 1993. Then 
the Taylor-rule simulated value deviates from the actual path, showing that it would drive 
the interest rate to zero by early 1995. Namely, the Bank of Japan’s hesitation in easing in 
1994-95 was not typical even from its own reaction function. The FRB coefficients were 
obtained from the Volcker-Greenspan period, 1979:III to 1996:IV. When the FRB coefficients 
are used, the simulated interest rate was driven down to zero by 1993:II. Had Mr Greenspan 
taken charge of the Bank of Japan, the Bank would have adopted ZIRP much earlier. 
It might be possible that the Bank of Japan hesitated to move aggressively in cutting the 
interest rate when it was not legally independent because it would be politically difficult to 
raise the interest once lowered. Was the behavior any different once the independence is 
obtained? Let us examine the behaviour of the Bank of Japan after April 1998. 
Signs of the weakening economy were widespread in 1998, so why did it take so long to 
make a decision on introducing ZIRP? In 1998, the Bank of Japan made two small changes 
towards easing. First, on 9 September, the Bank of Japan decided to lower the call rate 
(policy interest rate) from below but near 0.50% to 0.25%. This was a clear step of monetary 
easing. On 13 November, the Bank of Japan decided to help financing corporations by using 
open market operations in CP. This broadening of operation instruments had both monetary 
policy and financial stability purposes. 
One possible explanation why ZIRP was not introduced until February 1999 was that it was 
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interest rate hits zero, the lower bound. (The nominal interest rate cannot be negative, 
otherwise cash hoarding will replace bank deposits, and the financial system will suffer 
massive disintermediation.) The last card should be kept for a sharp, abrupt decline in 
economic activities or a near meltdown of the financial system. However, keeping the last 
card in hand may have resulted in a slow, but steady decline in economic activities, and over 
time it had similar effects of not helping a stagnating economy. 
In order to gain some insights on why ZIRP was not introduced in 1998, we can check the 
voting record of Policy Board members. It is quite revealing how the Policy Board members 
were divided over whether a step of additional easing was needed. From June to August, 
1998, the no-change decision was made with 8 votes in favour and 1 vote against by Mr 
Nakahara. He argued that additional easing was needed. When the lowering of the policy 
interest rate was decided in the MPM of 9 September 1998, Ms Shinotsuka dissented, 
arguing that lowering the interest rate would hurt households by depriving them of interest 
income. She continued to cast a dissenting vote from September 1998 to February 1999. 
Even Mr Nakahara did not dissent from the no-change decision from 9 September to 
13 November 1998, that is, he was content with the policy interest rate of 0.25%. But Mr 
Nakahara started to demand further easing from 28 November 1998 to January 1999, just 
before ZIRP was introduced. Therefore, in the MPMs of 28 November, 15 December 1998 
and 19 January 1999, two dissenting votes were recorded, but one leaning towards easing, 
and another leaning towards tightening. The logic of Ms Shinotsuka’s opposition to 0.25% 
was that it was on extraordinarily low interest rate and hurt households’ interest income. In 
the January meeting, she also suggested that the low interest rate constituted a subsidy to 
commercial banks. See Table 1 for the voting record of MPM Board members. 
Ms Shinotsuka’s argument seems to reflect a popular confusion among the public that the 
zero interest rate hurt the elderly and pensioners. In fact, persons or households with 
nominally fixed assets (bank deposits) will have higher purchasing power as prices go down. 
They will be better off in deflation rather than inflation. Moreover, at the time, a political 
decision froze an inflation slide clause of pensions in order to prevent the nominal amount of 
pensions from decreasing. Therefore, nominally rigid pensions make pensioners better off in 
the deflationary environment. Anyway, between the two extremes, one proposing an interest 
hike and another proposing an interest decline, most members took the wait-and-see 
position from September 1998 to February 1999. The Governor’s view, that was expressed 
in speeches and press conferences, was also similar to Ms. Shinotsuka in that deflation was 
not something serious and worrisome. 
2.4.  Termination of ZIRP 
After the zero interest rate was introduced in the spring of 1999, the economy started to 
recover. The Japanese financial system was stabilised by the second capital injection to 
large banks at the end of March 1999. The Japan premium that Japanese banks had to pay 
to western banks in the interbank market disappeared in April 1999. (See Ito and Harada 
(2004, 2005).) The worldwide IT stock price increases (later labelled as the IT stock price 
bubble) boosted confidence thus stimulating consumption and investment. The recovery was 
partly supported by the information, communication and technology (ICT) stock price 
increases. Stock prices of ICT-related companies rose sharply from the spring of 1999 to the 
beginning of 2000. The ICT stock price boom also spilled over to other sectors. The mood 
became bright by the end of 1999. The GDP growth rate rose in 1999 Q2 into positive 
territory, and after a slight dip in 1999 Q3, the growth rate became convincingly high in 
1999 Q4. The inflation rate also showed some signs of increasing (but was still negative) in 





Month/date  Unanimous?  Votes  Decision  Bias in Dissent 
1998/4/9  ˓ = yes   near  0.5%   
1998/4/24  ˓      
1998/5/19  ˓      
1998/6/12  ʷ = no  7-2   ++  (more  easing) 
1998/6/25  ʷ  8-1   + 
1998/7/16  ʷ  8-1   + 
1998/7/28  ʷ  8-1   + 
1998/8/11  ʷ  8-1   + 
1998/9/9  ʷ  8-1  0.25%  – (more tightening) 
1998/9/24  ʷ  8-1   – 
1998/10/13  ʷ  8-1   – 
1998/10/28  ʷ  8-1   – 
1998/11/13  ʷ  8-1   – 
1998/11/28  ʷ  7-2  Lower to 0.25%  + and – 
1998/12/15  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/1/19  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/2/12  ʷ  8-1 Toward  0.15% – 
1999/2/25  ʷ  7-2  Toward 0.15%  + and – 
1999/3/12  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/3/25  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/4/9  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/4/22  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/5/18  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/6/14  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/6/28  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/7/16  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/8/13  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/9/9  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/9/21  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
1999/10/13  ʷ  6-2  0%  + and – 
1999/10/27  ʷ  6-2  0%  + and – 
1999/11/12  ʷ  6-2  "  + and – 
1999/11/26  ʷ  6-2  "  + and – 
1999/12/17  ʷ  6-2  "  + and – 
2000/1/17  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
2000/2/10  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
2000/2/24  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
2000/3/8  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
2000/3/24  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
2000/4/10  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
2000/4/27  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
2000/5/17  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
2000/6/12  ʷ    "  + and – 
2000/6/28  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
2000/7/17  ʷ  7-2  "  + and – 
2000/8/11  ʷ  7-2  Raise to 0.25%  – and – 
2000/10/13  ʷ  8-1 0.25%  + 
2000/10/30  ʷ  8-1 "  + 
2000/11/17  ʷ  8-1 0.25%  + 
2000/11/30  ʷ  8-1   + 
2000/12/15  ʷ  8-1 "  + 112  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
When Governor Hayami and some Board members started to suggest in the spring of 2000 
that ZIRP might be terminated soon, many economists and government officials questioned 
the basis for early tightening. The economy was only on a fragile recovery path, and the 
internal and external environment was turning worse, as the IT stock bubble had burst. The 
US economy was slowing down due to the collapse of IT stock prices. Domestic 
consumption and investment were also slowing down. However, the Bank of Japan pushed 
the agenda. It is said that the Bank wanted to raise the interest rate in the July MPM meeting, 
but that this was pushed back by one month because it feared a negative impact of the 
failure of the Sogo Department Store. As the department store failure turned out to be not so 
negative for the overall economy, the motion was tabled in the MPM of August 2000. 
In the 11 August MP meeting, the government officials who attended the meeting without 
voting power argued that it would be too early to raise the interest rate. The government 
officials, based on a clause in the Bank of Japan law, submitted a motion to delay the voting 
on the interest rate hike by one month. This is the maximum resistance and show of 
displeasure that the government can make against the independent central bank. The delay 
motion was voted down by the votes of 1 in favour to 8 against. Then, the motion for an 
interest rate hike was passed by 7 in favour and 2 against. Mr Nakahara sided with the 
government proposal to table the vote for the termination, and also opposed to the 
termination of ZIRP. Mr Ueda, who had always voted with the majority since his appointment 
in April 1998, dissented from the termination of ZIRP saying that it might be too early to tell 
the economy was on firm ground and that the cost of a wait-and-see attitude to ZIRP would 
not be so high. 
The MPM decision was to raise the call rate from 0% to 0.25%, showing the majority of the 
Board members’ confidence that the economy was on a firm recovery path: “At present, 
Japan’s economy is showing clearer signs of recovery, and this gradual upturn, led mainly by 
business fixed investment, is likely to continue. Under such circumstances, the downward 
pressure on prices stemming from weak demand has markedly receded.” (See, for the full 
text concerning the policy decision, Appendix 2.) 
However, what followed in the economy in the autumn of 2000 confirmed the fears of the 
critics of the Bank decision. The recession started two months after the interest rate hike, 
and the CPI inflation rate turned sharply negative (see Figure 2). Economic conditions 
deteriorated towards the end of 2000. 
2.5.  The termination of ZIRP a mistake 
When ZIRP was introduced for the first time in March 1999, the exit condition from ZIRP had 
not been explicit - no precise definition of “deflation concerns” or “dispelled” was available. It 
was not clear at all which price indicator would be used and which rate of change would be 
regarded as deflation. 
When the economic recovery became stronger in autumn 1999 to spring 2000, the Bank of 
Japan became eager to terminate ZIRP. Governor Hayami indicated an early termination 
through several speeches. The first indication appeared in the Policy Board Minutes of April 
2000. Indeed, the economic growth rate was higher, partly fuelled by the global ICT boom. 
ICT stock prices increased sharply from autumn 1999 to spring 2000. It looked likely that 
higher growth would fill the GDP gap and soon prices would start to rise. CPI inflation was 
still negative, but the degree of deflation was becoming less. 
To be fair, the economy did look good in the spring of 2000. The GDP growth rate of the 
fourth quarter 1999 was –2.4% (that became known in April 2000), but the first quarter 
numbers were all good. The Bank of Japan, in the opening sentences of its monthly outlook 
reports, changed its overall assessment of the economy from “clear signs of a self-sustained 
recovery in private demand have not been observed yet” to “recovery started in some areas 
of private demand, as seen in a gradual upturn in business fixed investment” in April 2000, BIS Papers No 31  113
 
 
and then to “Japan’s economy is recovering gradually, with corporate profits and business 
fixed investment continuing to increase” in July 2000. The same wording appeared in August 
2000. 
However, ICT stock prices had been declining since March, and the prospects for the US 
economy were weakening. The two engines of recovery, exports and investment, could be 
forecasted to slow down soon. 
Let us examine these issues more quantitatively. The following Taylor rule equation is 
considered to evaluate Japan’s monetary policy. The specification follows Clarida (1999), 









t y r i  (1) 
where it is the short-term interest rate, r
f is the long-term equilibrium real rate, yt is the GDP 
gap, and π1 and π* are the inflation rate (defined by the GDP deflator) and the target inflation 
rate (defined by the GDP deflator), respectively. Parameters βy and βπ are to be estimated by 
the data. For the interest rate, the call rate is used. The GDP gap is defined as the log 
difference between potential GDP and actual GDP. The potential GDP level is estimated by 
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where, Yt–1 is the level of real GDP in the preceding period, λ is a weight parameter and set 
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The GDP gap is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 
























































































































































































































The Taylor rule described above is estimated for the period from 1981 to 1998 and results 
are presented in Table 2. The coefficient on the GDP deflator is above 1 and comparable to 114  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
a typical value in the existing literature, while the coefficient on the GDP gap is smaller than 
the comparable one in the literature. 
Table 2 
Taylor equation 
Dependent variable: call rate 
Sample period  1981:1-1998:4 
Constant 5.717*** 
(s.e.) 0.184 
GDP deflator  1.264*** 
(s.e.) 0.136 





*, ** and *** mean that the null hypotheses are rejected by 10%,5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Figure 4 shows the in-sample and out-of-sample fitted values of the Taylor equations using 
the estimated coefficients above. These are interpreted as the normal responses of the Bank 
of Japan, given the behaviour in 1981-98. The interest rate increase from 1998 to 1990 was 
much quicker and the lowering in 1991-93 would also have been quicker. According to this 
estimate, the call rate would go to zero precisely at the same time as the actual rate did, 

















































































































































































Actual call rate GDP deflator
Figure 4 
Target call rate by Clarida’s formulation  
(Taylor (1999, p 342)), estimation sample 1981-98 BIS Papers No 31  115
 
 
As discussed, there have been several different kinds of Taylor rule estimations for the 
1990s. The estimates presented here broadly agree with others, but what is peculiar 
(ie different from other estimates) about this estimation is that the simulation value is much 
higher than the actual in 1997. 
This result can be interpreted such that using a simple rule equation with GDP deflator, one 
can conclude that the lifting of the zero interest rate policy deviated from the past policy 
setting of the Bank of Japan. Of course the Taylor rule has some shortcomings (see Ito and 
Mishkin (2006) for cautionary notes), and results cannot be overly played up. However, the 
decision of August 2000 to end ZIRP was certainly a controversial one. 
Kamada (2005) presents a careful analysis of the policy evaluation, with real-time estimation - 
preparing the data set known at the time of the policy decision, rather than relying on the 
data base that are available at the time of analysis much later. He constructed several output 
gap measures and applied the Taylor rule equations. He tried several different ways in 
presentation of the deviation of the Taylor rule type estimated gap and actual rate. First, he 
concluded that Bank of Japan policy in the late 1980s could have been tighter and that in the 
early 1990s could have been relaxed sooner. Second, most of the results, including the 
conventional and standard cases in Kamada (2005, p 326), show that the zero interest rate 
should not have been lifted in 2000. It may not be incorrect to interpret his result as support 
to a view that the target rate in 2000 remained negative, suggesting that lifting ZIRP in 
August 2000 was a mistake, although he refrains from such an interpretation. 
In sum, there is little question that the decision to terminate ZIRP was a mistake ex post, 
since the economy turned into recession only two months later, and deflation got much 
worse in the following months. Moreover, the policy to raise the interest rate had to be 
reversed only seven months later in view of the deteriorating economy. An interesting 
question is whether the decision was a mistake ex ante. The economy did look to be on a 
recovery path in the first quarter of 2000, and an interest hike by 0.25% was small enough 
not to disturb investment or consumption. On the other hand, the ICT bubble was already on 
the way of bursting, and the US economy was slowing down. There were many forecasts 
that predicted slower growth in both the United States and Japan. The exit was attempted 
when the CPI inflation rate was still negative, without any clear sign that deflation would be 
ending soon. In the midst of deflation with weak forecasts ahead, the judgment on lifting the 
ZIRP can be considered a mistake, even in the ex ante sense. 
2.6. Quantitative  easing 
By the end of 2000, economic activities had slowed down considerably, and stock prices had 
declined substantially. The MP Board members, realizing that something had to be done, 
started to explore ways to stimulate the economy. Many outsiders speculated that the Bank 
would revert to ZIRP. The Governor issued “instructions to the Bank’s staff” (MPM document) 
on 19 January 2001, asking the staff to come up with an idea how to “examine the possible 
room for further improvements in the way of liquidity provision to the market, with a view to 
ensuring the smooth functioning and stability of the financial market”. In the 9 February MPM, 
the official discount rate was cut from 0.5% to 0.35% and the so-called lombard-type lending 
scheme was introduced (namely, capping the interbank rate at 0.35% for anyone who has 
collateral). In the 28 February MPM, the official discount rate was cut to 0.25%, and the 
policy interest rate was cut from 0.25% to 0.10%. However, these changes did not make any 
impact on the market. 
The Bank of Japan made a substantial policy change in the MPM meeting of 19 March 2001. 
The Bank decided that the policy instrument would be changed from the interest rate to 
current accounts at the Bank of Japan, the sum of required and excess reserves, and that 
excess reserves would be maintained. The Bank emphasised that the decision was 
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the economic conditions warrant monetary easing as drastic as is unlikely to be taken under 
ordinary circumstances.”(This quote is translated by the Bank of Japan. See Appendix 3 for a 
full text.) The required reserve was about 4 trillion yen at the time, and the target was set to 
be 5 trillion yen. Enough liquidity to the market is provided to the system, so that the banks 
would place excess funds in the Bank of Japan account that bears zero interest. By 
implication, the zero interest rate would result. 
The change of instrument was a radical move towards quantitative easing (QE). Whether 
providing higher monetary base at the zero interest rate made any difference was, and still is, 
controversial. However, at least it had the psychological effect that the Bank of Japan had 
become more serious about exploring ways to fight deflation. 
What monetary policy can do under deflation and ZIRP has become a hotly debated question 
in policy as well as academic circles. Several non-conventional monetary policy measures 
were proposed and debated. One such measure was to increase the amount of long-term 
bond purchases. The Bank increased the amount of monthly purchases of government 
bonds (JGB) from 400 billion yen in 1998, in several steps, to 1,200 billion yen by October 
2002. 
The decision of 19 March 2001 was also accompanied by a more explicit condition on when 
quantitative easing would end. Conditions for making a decision to exit from QE and ZIRP 
were clarified as follows: “The new procedures for money market operations continue to be in 
place until the consumer price index (excluding perishables, on a nationwide basis) registers 
stably 0% or an increase year on year.” This was innovative in two respects. First, the exit 
condition clearly stated that the CPI (excluding fresh food) was a measure to watch. This was 
a reversal of the position mentioned in the October 2000 document. Second, the new exit 
condition was much clearer than the earlier exit condition (“until the deflationary concerns are 
dispelled”), in that the numerical condition, “0% or an increase year on year”, was mentioned. 
This can be seen as a step toward inflation targeting (but still far away from a full-fledged 
inflation targeting framework). However, how “stably” was defined remained ambiguous. 
The Bank of Japan also announced in the March 2001 decision that it would increase the 
amount of monthly JGB purchases that was set to be 400 million at the time. This decision 
was to answer calls for additional measures even at the zero interest rate. Purchasing assets 
that are riskier than short-term government paper would help asset reallocation in the 
economy, so that the private sector would take more risk. It was also expected that the Bank 
of Japan purchasing longer-term assets would flatten the yield curve, so that investment that 
is sensitive to a long-term interest rate, rather than a short-term interest rate, would be 
stimulated. This was an additional policy the central bank could implement even under ZIRP. 
Figure 5 shows how the amount of long-term JGB purchases and the target amount of 
current accounts at the Bank of Japan were increased since the introduction of QE in March 
2001. Figure 6 shows the decline in the interest rate towards zero since 1998. 
The economy remained weak in 2001. The economic growth rate registered four consecutive 
quarters of negative growth from 2001 Q2, and the inflation rate remained about –1% from 
early 2001 to early 2003. The Bank of Japan tried several steps to enhance QE. First, it 
increased the target amount of current account balances in several steps (August 2001, 
December 2001 and October 2002). Second, the Bank increased the purchase of JGB in 
four steps (August 2001, December 2001, February 2003 and October 2002) from 
400 million yen to 1.2 trillion yen. Third, the official interest rate was reduced from 0.50% to 
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3. Inflation  targeting 
Many critics were calling for the Bank of Japan to adopt inflation targeting in order to show its 
resolve to fight deflation. Adoption of an inflation targeting framework with decisive actions 
may influence inflation expectations. Ito (2004b) examined the MPM minutes to see whether 
the MPM came close to adopting inflation targeting during the course of fighting deflation. 
Inflation target advocates argued that the inflation targeting framework would have a positive 
influence on inflation expectations, which would help fight against deflation by changing the 
forward-looking real interest rate. Moreover, clarifying the goal of the policy might be 
necessary for an independent central bank to be accountable for its action. 
There are several arguments opposing the inflation targeting framework. First, the most 
commonly heard argument against inflation targeting was that credibility would be lost, rather 
than built, if inflation targeting was announced when there was no instrument to get out of 
deflation. Second, inflation targeting would not influence inflation expectations, since these 
are backward-looking. Third, some regarded inflation targeting as a way to increase the 
inflation rate no matter what, in order to help debtors in the economy - large indebted 
corporations and the national government with large fiscal debts. Once generated, inflation 
would be difficult to stop. Fourth, if inflation targeting was credible, then the long-term interest 
rate would go up immediately (via the Fischer equation) and that would be bad for the 
economy. Mr Hayami also argued, at an early stage of his regime, that restoring inflation 
would delay structural reform. (See Ito (2004b, pp 246-51) for pros and cons of inflation 
targeting.) 
The discussion on inflation targeting in MPMs, measured by “word counts” in the Minutes, 
peaked in the autumn of 1999, responding to the critics outside the Bank. But the discussion 
was shelved in the spring of 2000, as it was decided to commission a study from the staff on 
price stability. After six months, the Bank of Japan issued a report called “On Price Stability” 
in October 2000. In this report, the Bank was quite negative on defining numerically an 
appropriate inflation rate: the Bank refused to endorse any price index as an appropriate 
measure of inflation; and it refused to define price stability, saying price stability is defined 
“as a situation which is neither inflationary nor deflationary”. It sounds like a tautology, since 
inflation and deflation cannot be defined without defining price stability. The report stated 
that: “In view of current development of prices in Japan, it is difficult to set specific numerical 
values to the definition of price stability that are consistent with the sound development of the 
economy. Furthermore, even if some numerical values were announced, they would not 
serve as a reliable guidepost in the conduct of monetary policy, and the exercise would not 
likely contribute to enhancing transparency of the conduct of monetary policy. Therefore, it is 
not deemed appropriate to define price stability by numerical values.” This kind of 
assessment is quite far from conventional wisdom in the literature of inflation targeting. By 
this negative assessment, inflation targeting was not discussed at all in MPMs in 2000 and 
the first half of 2001. See Ito (2004b: pp 245-46) for the second wave and third wave of 
inflation targeting discussions in MPMs, mostly in negative tones, in the second half of 2001 
and late 2002. 
Monetary policy during the Hayami regime gives an impression that it was behind the curve 
in easing monetary policy, and timid in trying non-conventional policies, not to mention 
mistaken in tightening in August 2000. (Cargill et al (2000) called this an independence trap, 
namely, the Bank tried to be less active in order to lower the probability of mistakes, so that it 
could quickly establish credibility after obtaining independence. However, the attempt did not 
succeed.) Mr Hayami and the majority of the Board rejected several measures, and then 
switched position, without ample explanations for the switch. For example, an increase in the 
purchase of government bonds was rejected earlier as an option, but was implemented later. 
Quantitative easing, an increase in excess reserves, was also rejected earlier, but suddenly 
adopted in March 2001. These switches gave an impression that the Bank of Japan was 
trying to do something, but only reluctantly. The failure was not tactical, but strategic. There 
was no firm framework to guide the policy, such as an inflation targeting framework. (For 
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4. Monetary  policy,  2003-05 
4.1. Commitment  effect 
A new Governor and two Deputy Governors were appointed in March 2003, upon expiration 
of the five-year term for the previous team of top management. The newly appointed 
Governor Fukui used to be Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan, before he resigned and 
took a position in the private sector in 1998. Once appointed, Governor Fukui was keen on 
building a better relationship with the government and was skilful in communicating to the 
public that he would be fighting deflation with commitment. The rhetoric of fighting deflation 
was much better in his speeches soon after he took office. He argued that he would be 
patient before terminating quantitative easing (see Fukui (2003)). 
The Japanese economy in the spring of 2003 was considered to be very weak. The Nikkei 
stock price index fell below 8,000, merely one fifth of its peak 13 years before. The 
government became tough on the treatment of accounting standard for the balance sheets of 
major banks in 2002-03, and many banks had to declare heavy losses in the spring of 2003. 
Some banks had to be rescued by the government. The systemic stability of the financial 
markets was regarded as threatened. 
The Bank of Japan, under the leadership of Mr Fukui, explored ways to stimulate the 
economy and stabilise the financial system, although the room to manoeuvre was very much 
limited. The policy interest rate had been lowered to zero, and it cannot become negative. 
The two prominent measures of quantitative easing were the increase in the monthly 
purchase of long bonds and the target for current account balances (namely, excess 
reserves). The Bank of Japan decided to raise the current account balance target to show it 
further supported the fight against deflation. The target was raised from 17-22 trillion yen to 
22-27 trillion yen in April, just one month after the new team of the Governor and two Deputy 
Governors took office. The decision was unanimous among the nine voting members of the 
Monetary Policy Meeting. 
The target level of current account balances was increased three more times in the next nine 
months: In May, it was increased from 22-27 trillion to 27-30 trillion; in October, to 27-32 trillion; 
and finally in January 2004, to 30-35 trillion. 
The May 2003, October 2003 and January 2004 decisions were not unanimous. The May 
decision was opposed by two members; the October decision was opposed by three 
members; and the January decision was opposed by two members. Opposition was based 
on the uncertain effects of raising the target level on the economy, while there was no 
imminent risk in the financial markets. 
Indeed, the effect of having excess reserves was not seriously debated at the time. Some 
seem to have believed that it is good to provide more than enough liquidity to prevent sudden 
failure of banks. Since several banks were rumoured to be very weak in their capital position, 
providing excess liquidity was considered to be a safety measure. 
However, the increase of the target level for current account balances was decided as a 
monetary policy measure, in addition to any stabilizing effect on the financial market and 
institutions. The transmission channel from excess reserves to output is a subject of 
discussion. Several channels were thought to be possible. First, providing more liquidity to 
the banking system leads to the expansion of monetary base and then money supply. This 
channel is important if the bottleneck for recovery was a credit rationing or bank loan 
problem. However, this did not prove to be an effective channel. Bank lending continued to 
decline during the ZIRP and QE period. 
Second, providing liquidity worked as a safety valve for a possible, sudden liquidity squeeze 
that would jeopardise systemic stability. For financial stability purposes, an expansion of 
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Third, QE was a signal that the Bank of Japan would continue monetary easing. Since it 
would take time to reduce liquidity without disruption, the Bank of Japan was committed to 
easing and ZIRP into future by providing excess reserves. It was called the policy “duration 
effect” in Japan. Therefore, the more excess reserves, the stronger the commitment. Hence, 
the increase of the target for current account balances at the Bank of Japan made an impact 
on the economy to flatten the yield curve. Oda and Ueda (2005) argue that increasing 
amounts of current account target helped keeping the yield curve flatter, since QE influenced 
expectations of how long ZIRP would continue in the future. 
4.2.  Exit condition elaborated 
In October 2003, the MPM issued the document on improving transparency, in which the exit 
condition was clarified. Earlier, the inflation rate (excl fresh food) be zero or above, stably. 
The document defined the meaning of “stably”. There were two criteria for judgment. First, 
the backward-looking inflation rate had to be on average at zero or above. Second, the 
forward-looking inflation rate had to be forecast by the Board members to be at zero or 
above. Details will be described in the next section on exit conditions. But, even under the 
new definition, it was far from full-fledged inflation targeting, since the time frame for 
overcoming deflation was not committed, and no upper bound for tolerance was given. 
Stock prices had declined significantly in 2002 and again in the spring of 2003. The Nikkei 
225 index recorded a low of 7,600 in April 2003, less than one fifth of the peak at the end of 
1989. But the stock market regained confidence for the rest of the year, as did the economy 
as a whole. The growth rate increased to close to 6% (quarter to quarter rate, annualised) in 
2003 Q4 and 2004 Q1. Optimism spread to the economy. The size of deflation shrank from 
about 1% to near zero by the end of 2004. 
The Bank of Japan adopted some of the non-conventional measures proposed by critics, 
including purchases of long bonds. However, other measures were not tried, including 
purchases of foreign currency denominated bonds, equities (indexed equity funds listed on 
the exchange) and real estate (funds); the adoption of inflation targeting; and cooperation 
with the Ministry of Finance to carry out non-sterilised interventions. 
Two quick notes on these non-conventional measures may be added. First, although the 
Bank of Japan bought equities from commercial banks in 2002, it was stated as a measure to 
stabilise the financial system and not part of monetary policy. Commercial banks had 
substantial holdings of equities on their books, and as the stock prices declined, they had 
become burdens as some marking-to-market had to be done and any losses had to be 
deducted from bank capital positions. However, selling stocks in the market would further 
drive the prices down, with a negative impact on the balance sheet. Therefore the Bank of 
Japan decided to purchase those equities from commercial banks outside the market. The 
Bank took pains to exclude the measure from the agenda of MPM. It was decided in the 
“regular” Board meeting. The Bank was afraid that once the purchase of equities was 
regarded as part of monetary policy, the pressure to do more might increase. 
Second, the increase in monetary base during calendar year 2003 roughly equalled the 
cumulative amount of intervention, mostly because of the target amount for current accounts. 
However, the suggestion of unsterilised interventions was rebuffed as “mere coincidence” by 
Deputy Governor Iwata. (See Ito (2004c) for a detailed description.) 
Of course, in effect, any simultaneous increase in intervention and monetary base can be 
viewed as unsterilised intervention by definition. The reason that the Bank of Japan was 
reluctant to play that up was that it wished to avoid its monetary policy being ruled by the 
exchange rate policy (in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance). Bank of Japan 
economists often cite the period in the late 1980s bubble when there was pressure to lower 
the interest rate to stem yen appreciation pressure. BIS Papers No 31  121
 
 
Another reason why the Bank of Japan was reluctant to engage in unsterilised intervention 
was that the traditional benefits of unsterilised intervention as opposed to sterilised 
intervention disappear at the zero interest rate bound. In the usual setting of positive interest 
rates, an unsterilised intervention is more potent than a sterilised intervention since 
unsterilised intervention will lower the interest rate, which would be stimulative for the 
economy. However, under ZIRP, there is no difference in the interest rate consequence 
between an unsterilised intervention and a sterilised intervention. In 2003 the Bank of Japan 
was operating under QE, which is ZIRP with excess reserves. Unsterilised interventions will 
expand the monetary base faster than sterilised interventions. If QE is more powerful than 
ZIRP, which the Bank of Japan must have believed at the time of its introduction, unsterilised 
interventions would be more expansionary. 
5. The  exit 
5.1.  Exit conditions: a review 
The Bank of Japan had articulated conditions for terminating ZIRP or QE, along with its 
policy implementation. The first commitment was made when ZIRP was introduced in 
February 1999, when the policy was to continue until deflation concerns were dispelled. 
However, ZIRP was terminated in August 2000 amid deflation. The decision was based on 
the hope of getting out of deflation if the economy continued its expansion. As argued above, 
this turned out to be a mistake, at least in judgment. 
The second commitment was made when ZIRP was readopted with an additional policy 
measure, quantitative easing (QE), in March 2001. this time the exit condition was much 
clearer. QE was to continue “until the consumer price index (excluding perishables, on a 
nationwide basis) registers stably above 0% year on year”. CPI (excluding fresh food) was 
mentioned as a price index for judging inflation and deflation. Also, the numerical condition, 
zero or above, was mentioned as an exit condition. These were advances compared to the 
experience of the earlier ZIRP episode. The only ambiguity was “stably”. 
The third occasion was to clarify what “stably” means in a numerical manner. In October 
2003, the Policy Board issued the following three conditions for terminating QE in the future: 
“(1) the most recently published core CPI should register 0% or above, but also that such 
tendency should be confirmed over a few months; (2) the Bank needs to be convinced that 
the prospective core CPI will not be expected to register below 0%; and (3) the above 
conditions are only the necessary condition. There may be cases, however, that the Bank will 
judge it appropriate to continue with quantitative easing even if these two conditions are 
fulfilled.” 
As an important footnote, it should be pointed out here that “core CPI” is the CPI excluding 
fresh food, but including energy prices. (The Bank of Japan changed the translation from 
“CPI, excluding fresh food (or perishables)”, to “core CPI”, but the definition is the same.) 
The first condition was to confirm a positive rate of inflation, for a few months, with a 
backward-looking definition (actual core-CPI rate, over the 12-month period). The second 
was to confirm a positive rate of inflation for the forward-looking manner. The third condition 
states that the backward and forward conditions were only a set of necessary conditions. 
Even when the two conditions were satisfied, QE might not be terminated. 
The second condition could be tricky, if forecasts are not specified as whose forecasts. The 
decision also states that, for (2), “many Policy Board members need to make the forecasts 
that the core CPI will register above 0% during the forecasting period”. The forecasts are 
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These three conditions (or two numerical necessary conditions and a judgmental condition) 
made it much clearer that both backward-looking and forward-looking inflation rates had to 
be zero or above. Although these exit conditions were far more transparent than before, 
there remained several questions: Why not 1% or above instead of 0% or above? Why not 
announce a ceiling on the desirable inflation rate in addition to the floor? When were these 
conditions likely to be achieved? Would the Bank introduce measures with a view to 
achieving these conditions faster? 
The floor of 0% was first used in March 2001, probably because that was the least 
controversial condition as stable price level. The Policy Board was operating on the basis of 
consensus, and to bring in the numerical condition a broadly acceptable condition was 
needed. By stating it must be “stably” above zero, there was discretionally room to wait for 
some positive number, rather than just above zero. The upward tolerance was not 
mentioned. 
The Bank of Japan rejects the interpretation that the March 2001 condition was inflation 
targeting or that the October 2003 clarification was a form of inflation targeting. Objectively 
speaking, these numerical conditions were steps towards inflation targeting. However, 
important ingredients were still missing if they were to be interpreted as an inflation targeting 
framework. The ceiling was not announced, as zero percent seems to be a floor. The 
framework was only an exit condition, and not a permanent framework. The commitment to 
overcome the deflationary state was less clear, as the horizon and instruments to achieve 
the exit conditions were not clarified. The conditions read like a set of circumstances that the 
Bank of Japan would sit and wait for rather than something the Bank intended to achieve. 
For these reasons, it is far-fetched to interpret these conditions as constituting inflation 
targeting. 
5.2.  Preparation for the exit 
As signs of economic recovery became clearer, an exit from QE became a popular topic in 
2005. Starting in April 2005, some Board members proposed lowering the target amount for 
current account balances at the Bank of Japan. The market started to expect that the Bank 
would make a move to exit from QE and raise the interest rate by the summer of 2006. From 
the spring of 2005, the Governor and many Bank Board members gave speeches and press 
interviews, arguing that the economy was recovering and deflation would end by mid-2006. 
Obviously, high GDP growth rates and strong profit figures of major corporations gave 
support to the view that deflation would end soon. 
In the Outlook of April 2005, the Bank changed the coverage of inflation expectations to 
include the range of forecasts of the inflation rate for FY 2006 (the inflation rate 
12-24  months later) expressed by the Board members. This may have been due to the 
desire to show that the second exit condition could be satisfied immediately. The median 
view was that deflation would finally be over by FY 2006. The view was reflected in the voting 
results in MPMs. 
Until March 2005, the decision to target current account balances at 30-35 trillion yen was 
carried unanimously in the MPM meetings (since February 2004 when the target was raised). 
On 6 April, one dissenting vote (Mr Fukuma) appeared, and the opposition increased to two 
votes (Messrs Fukuma and Mizuno) in the 28 April and 20 May MPMs. They proposed that 
the current account balance target should be lowered to 27-32 trillion yen. Then one member 
(Mr Mizuno) went a step further and proposed lowering the target to 25-30 trillion yen, while 
the other member (Mr Fukuma) maintained his proposal of moving the target to 27-32 trillion 
yen. Their earlier arguments, in April and May, were as follows. First, since financial market 
stability was restored, excess liquidity would no longer be necessary. Second, reducing the 
huge balance would take time; therefore when raising the policy interest rate would finally be 
required, it might be unnecessarily delayed unless the target current account balance had 
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reserves, the same stimulative effect could be achieved. Fourth, demand for liquidity was 
declining, so that lowering the target would not disrupt the market. (See Minutes of MPM on 
28 April 2005, available on the Bank of Japan homepage.) 
The dissenters’ reasons for the proposal to lower the target amount had changed slightly by 
September 2005. First, it was argued that the zero interest rate had distorted the market 
mechanism and made market participants unaware of the possible risk of interest rate 
volatility. Second, in order to maintain the high balance, it had become necessary to conduct 
market operations with relatively long maturities, implying that it would take time to lower the 
target amount before raising the interest rate, thereby reducing the timeliness and flexibility 
of the Bank's conduct of monetary policy. Third, gradual reduction of the target amount was 
appropriate. Fourth, maintaining the zero interest rate without excess liquidity was enough to 
support economic recovery. Fifth, financial institutions' precautionary demand for liquidity had 
become lower. (The first four reasons were mentioned by Mr Fukuma and the third and fifth 
reasons by Mr Mizuno. See Minutes of MPM on 8 September 2005, available on the Bank of 
Japan homepage.) 
Although the inflation rate measured against a year earlier was still negative, it was expected 
to turn to positive in the following several months. First, the month-to-month inflation rates 
had registered positive rates in recent months, as shown in Table 3. Second, one-off effects 
of the rice and utilities price decline of the autumn of the previous year would be out of the 
range of 12 months by end-2005. Third, the past forecasts of Monetary Policy Board 
members may have had a bias towards lower inflation (ie overestimating the degree of 
deflation). If the downward bias were to persist even once the inflation rate turned positive, 
the actual inflation rate might turn out to be higher than 0.5% in 2006. It is also the case that 




CPI inflation rate (ex fresh food) 
  Month-to-month, annualised  Over the same month a year earlier 
Jan 2005  –0.8 –0.3 
Feb –0.1  –0.4 
Mar +0.3  –0.3 
Apr +0.3  –0.2 
May +0.2  0.0 
Jun –0.1  –0.2 
July –0.1  –0.2 
Aug +0.2  –0.1 
Sep +0.2  –0.1 
Oct +0.1  0.0 
Nov –0.2  0.1 
Dec +0.1  0.1 
Jan 2006  –0.4  0.5 
Feb –0.1  0.5 
Mar +0.3  0.5 
Apr +0.3  0.5 124  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
According to this view, the inflation rate would certainly be positive in 2006. Those who 
favoured tightening in the spring of 2006 also cited the past performance of forecasts of 
inflation and GDP growth by the Board members. The Board members tended to be more 
pessimistic than warranted by the subsequent outturn in 2004. The economy was stronger 
than the Board had forecast. 
The views expressed by Messrs Fukuma and Mizuno can be critically reviewed. First of all, 
why hurry? The inflation rate in September 2005 was –0.1% (compared to 12 months 
earlier), and the median of MPC members’ forecasts of the inflation rate in FY 2006 was a 
mere 0.5%. Should this be a concern for a central bank with a mandate of price stability? 
Second, the concern over the Bank possibly becoming “behind the curve” because of large 
current account balances was unwarranted. In order to get out of deflation, it is critically 
important to conduct monetary policy so as to convince the public that deflation will be 
ending soon (see eg Bernanke (2000, 2003), Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford 
(2003)). In other words, it is important to send a signal that the central bank is in control and 
has a strategy that cannot be ended prematurely. A credible way to do so is to pile up excess 
liquidity. Therefore, while Mr Fukuma’s analysis was correct in that it would take time to take 
out liquidity from the system, his conclusion did not necessarily follow. The point is that he 
thought that getting out of deflation was a foregone conclusion and that there was a risk that 
the inflation rate would become unacceptably high. Many critics, on the other hand, thought 
that maintaining the higher balances was still useful as it would strengthen expectations that 
deflation would finally end. The critics also argued that there was little risk that the inflation 
rate would become excessive. 
There were substantial voices that opposed an early termination, or preparation for 
termination, of quantitative easing in 2005. First, the CPI inflation rate was still negative. 
Even if the CPI inflation rate did turn positive, it might have been due to energy price 
increases, and it is debatable whether a supply shock (oil price increases) should be 
countered by monetary tightening. It is unfortunate that no CPI inflation rate excluding both 
fresh food and energy is published in Japan. 
5.3.  The exit, March 2006 
The Bank of Japan finally terminated QE on 9 March 2006, citing that the QE conditions had 
been satisfied. The Bank of Japan switched the policy instrument from the target for current 
account balances with the Bank to the interest rate. This is a return to ZIRP. However, since 
the excess reserves could not be brought down to zero at once without disruption to the 
financial market, ZIRP had to continue for several months. When the amount is brought 
down to near the amount of required reserves, then ZIRP could be terminated. 
The first condition, backward inflation rates being above zero for a few months, was 
considered to be satisfied, since the inflation rate had been positive since October (data until 
January 2006 had been available at that point). The second condition, forward-looking 
inflation as forecast by the Policy Board members, had been positive for 2006-07 since April 
2005. 
Some sceptics pointed out that the inflation rate had been positive only three months, and 
there was some downside risk. The US economy might slow down towards the second half 
of the year. But, in general the decision was accepted calmly. 
There was one other twist to this exit. The Bank of Japan disclosed the “understanding” of 
price stability as interpreted by the Policy Board members. The range was disclosed to be 
0-2% measured by CPI inflation. It was considered to be a medium-term inflation rate. Was 
this an introduction of inflation targeting? The Bank of Japan said this would not constitute 
inflation targeting, since it was not billed as a target. However, this could become an 
important step towards genuine inflation targeting further down the road. This was a positive 
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6. Concluding  remarks 
This paper has reviewed Japanese monetary policy from 1998 to the present. The beginning 
year of analysis was set at 1998 because it was the year the Bank of Japan gained legal 
independence. Transparency, such as MPM minutes disclosure, has been greatly enhanced 
since 1998. The critical review of the first five years of its independence reveals that the 
Bank’s policies were not aggressive enough to ease monetary policy. Moreover, it made a 
mistake of tightening amid deflation in August 2000. Adoption of quantitative easing in March 
2001 was significant, but could not prevent the economy from sliding into deflation and 
economic stagnation in 2001 and 2002. 
Governor Fukui took office in March 2003. He quickly changed the course towards more 
aggressive fighting of deflation by expanding the monetary base. He also used better rhetoric 
in convincing the public that the Bank of Japan would be patient, ie not raise the interest rate 
on the way out of deflation. The economy gained momentum in 2004 and into 2005. The 
decision to exit from quantitative easing was finally taken in March 2006 as the monetary 
Policy Board members concluded that the conditions for its ending had been fulfilled. Now 
the debate is about when the Bank of Japan will also exit from the zero interest rate policy. 126  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
Appendix 1:  
Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP), 12 February 1999 
“(1)   The Bank of Japan today held a Monetary Policy Meeting, a regular 
meeting of the Policy Board on monetary policy. By majority vote, the Policy 
Board determined to ease further the stance of money market operations for the 
inter-meeting period ahead as follows: 
The Bank of Japan will provide more ample funds and encourage the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate to move as low as possible. 
To avoid excessive volatility in the short-term financial markets, the 
Bank of Japan will, by paying due consideration to maintaining market 
function, initially aim to guide the above call rate to move around 
0.15%, and subsequently induce further decline in view of the market 
developments.” BIS Papers No 31  127
 
 
Appendix 2:  
Termination of ZIRP, 11 August 2000 
“1.  In February 1999, the Bank of Japan adopted the zero interest rate policy, 
unprecedented both in and out of Japan, to counter the possibility of mounting 
deflationary pressure and prevent further deterioration in economic conditions. 
Furthermore, it announced in April 1999 to continue the zero interest rate policy 
until deflationary concern is dispelled. 
2.  Over the past one year and a half, Japan’s economy has substantially 
improved, due to such factors as support from macroeconomic policy, recovery of 
the world economy, diminishing concerns over the financial system, and 
technological innovation in the broad information and communications area. At 
present, Japan’s economy is showing clearer signs of recovery, and this gradual 
upturn, led mainly by business fixed investment, is likely to continue. Under such 
circumstances, the downward pressure on prices stemming from weak demand 
has markedly receded. 
Considering these developments, the Bank of Japan feels confident that Japan's 
economy has reached the stage where deflationary concern has been dispelled, 
the condition for lifting the zero interest rate policy.” 128  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
Appendix 3:  
Quantitative easing, introduced on 19 March 2001 
“3.  In light of this, the Bank has come to a conclusion that the economic 
conditions warrant monetary easing as drastic as is unlikely to be taken under 
ordinary circumstances. Accordingly, the Bank decided at its Monetary Policy 
Meeting of today to take the following policy actions. 
(i)  Change in the operating target for money market operations 
The main operating target for money market operations be changed 
from the current uncollateralized overnight call rate to the outstanding 
balance of the current accounts at the Bank of Japan. Under the new 
procedures, the Bank provides ample liquidity, and the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate will be determined in the market at 
a certain level below the ceiling set by the Lombard-type lending 
facility. 
(ii)  CPI guideline for the duration of the new procedures 
The new procedures for money market operations continue to be in 
place until the consumer price index (excluding perishables, on a 
nationwide statistics) registers stably a zero percent or an increase 
year on year. 
(iii)  Increase in the current-account balance at the Bank of Japan and 
declines in interest rates 
For the time being, the balance outstanding at the Bank’s current 
accounts be increased to around 5 trillion yen, or 1 trillion yen 
increase from the average outstanding of 4 trillion yen in February 
2001 … . As a consequence, it is anticipated that the uncollateralized 
overnight call rate will significantly decline from the current target 
level of 0.15 percent and stay close to zero percent under normal 
circumstances. 
(iv)  Increase in outright purchase of long-term government bonds 
The Bank will increase the amount of its outright purchase of long-
term government bonds from the current 400 billion yen per month, in 
case it considers that increase to be necessary for providing liquidity 
smoothly. The outright purchase is, on the other hand, subject to the 
limitation that the outstanding amount of long-term government bonds 
effectively held by the Bank, ie, after taking account of the 
government bond sales under gensaki repurchase agreements, be 
kept below the outstanding balance of banknotes issued.” BIS Papers No 31  129
 
 
Appendix 4:  
Clarification on the exit condition, 10 October 2003 
“2.  More Detailed Description of the Commitment to Maintaining the 
Quantitative Easing Policy 
With the aim of laying the foundation for sustainable growth of Japan’s economy, 
the Bank is currently committed to maintaining the quantitative easing policy until 
the consumer price index (excluding fresh food, on a nationwide basis, hereafter 
the core CPI) registers stably a zero percent or an increase year on year. Such 
commitment is underpinned by the following two conditions. 
First, it requires not only that the most recently published core CPI should register 
a zero percent or above, but also that such tendency should be confirmed over a 
few months. 
Second, the Bank needs to be convinced that the prospective core CPI will not be 
expected to register below a zero percent. This point will be described in such 
materials as the analysis and the forecasts of Policy Board members in the 
Outlook Report. To be more specific, many Policy Board members need to make 
the forecasts that the core CPI will register above a zero percent during the 
forecasting period. 
The above conditions are the necessary condition. There may be cases, 
however, that the Bank will judge it appropriate to continue with quantitative 
easing even if these two conditions are fulfilled.” 130  BIS Papers No 31
 
 
Appendix 5:  
Dissenting voices in the stay-the-course decision of the  
MPM (Minutes, 8 September 2005) 
Mr T Fukuma dissented from the above proposal for the following reasons. First, as market 
participants’ views on the economy and interest rates were changing, provision of massive 
amounts of funds based on the current target range for the outstanding balance of current 
accounts at the Bank was hindering smooth formation of interest rates based on the market 
mechanism, and could also increase interest rate volatility risk. Therefore, the Bank should 
correct this situation as long as the maintenance of the current framework of the quantitative 
easing policy would not be hindered. Second, if the Bank continued to conduct market 
operations with relatively long maturities in order to maintain the outstanding balance of 
current accounts at the Bank within the target range, a longer period of time would be 
needed for the process of termination of the quantitative easing policy, thereby reducing the 
timeliness and flexibility of the Bank's conduct of monetary policy. Third, termination of the 
quantitative easing policy should be done gradually in a step-by-step manner, while carefully 
examining economic and financial developments. And fourth, it was possible to support the 
ongoing economic recovery and thereby emergence from the current situation of slight price 
declines by maintaining the zero interest rate environment based on the Bank's commitment 
in terms of policy duration. 
Mr A Mizuno dissented from the proposal for the following reasons. First, there had been no 
change from the downtrend in financial institutions’ precautionary demand for liquidity, and 
thus lowering the outstanding balance of current accounts at the Bank as a response to this 
was reasonable policy conduct. And second, to ensure financial market stability in the period 
around the termination of the quantitative easing policy, it would be appropriate to start 
lowering the outstanding balance in line with developments in the market, rather than 
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